Educational Justice and the Recognition of Marriage by Fitzgibbon, Scott T.
Boston College Law School
Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School
Boston College Law School Faculty Papers
7-6-2011
Educational Justice and the Recognition of
Marriage
Scott T. Fitzgibbon
Boston College Law School, fitzgisc@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/lsfp
Part of the Education Law Commons, Family Law Commons, and the Other Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Boston
College Law School Faculty Papers by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Scott T. Fitzgibbon. "Educational Justice and the Recognition of Marriage." Brigham Young University Education and Law Journal 20,
(2011): 263-278.
1 
 
 
  
 
EDUCATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE RECOGNITION OF MARRIAGE 
 
Scott FitzGibbon
1
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This article describes a fundamental dimension, ignored in the literature, of the ethical 
basis of the fiduciary relationship. It considers and rejects an account of the fiduciary 
relationship based on contract. It develops, instead, a virtue-based approach to the fiduciary 
relationship founded upon the goods of faithfulness, beneficence, clarity of thought, and 
dedication to the truth. 
This article proposes that the relationship between teacher and student is fiduciary. It 
develops the thesis that a primary or secondary school teacher has especially high duties to the 
student:  obligations, resembling those of a guardian, a trustee, an executor, and an attorney, of 
fidelity, zealous devotion to the well-being of the other party, and full disclosure. This article 
does not endorse this approach for the positive law. It is not here proposed that teachers be held 
legally liable for violations of those obligations. The topic of this article, rather, is  ethics. The 
teacher, it is here proposed, is morally a fiduciary. 
Teachers in primary and secondary schools are ethically fiduciaries in a special way 
because they exercise, exemplify, and transmit fiduciary virtues and,  preeminently,  the 
intellectual virtues.   
This Article sketches a few implications of virtue-based fiduciary ethics and proposes 
some implications for teachers pertinent to the recognition of marriage.     
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I. THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP IN LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 
 
A. Legal Doctrines and Principles 
 
A fiduciary is a trustee for the beneficiaries,
2
 a guardian for the ward,
3
 an attorney for a 
client,
4
 an executor for the heirs,
5
 a corporate director (or officer) for the corporation or its 
shareholders,
6
 and an agent for the principal.
7
 According to some authorities, a physician or a 
psychiatrist may be a fiduciary for a patient,
8
 and a partner may be a fiduciary for a partner.
9
 
                                                 
2
 See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, ET AL., BOGERT‘S TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §1 (3d ed. 2010) (―A trust may be 
defined as a fiduciary relationship in which one person holds a property interest, subject to an equitable obligation to 
keep or use that interest for the benefit of another.‖); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959) (―A trust . . . is 
a fiduciary relationship with respect to the property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held 
to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit of another person . . . .‖). See generally John H. 
Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty:  Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 929 (2005).  
3
 See In re Estate of Swiecicki, 477 N.E.2d 488, 490 (Ill. 1985); Lawrence Frolik, Is a Guardian the Alter Ego of the 
Ward?, 37 STETSON L. REV. 53, 54 (2007) (stating that the guardian has a fiduciary duty ―of care and loyalty to the 
ward‖); Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their 
Consequences, DUKE LAW SCHOOL FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP SERIES, Paper 47, 14 (Aug. 1, 2006), available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1047&context=duke_fs; Michael D. Casasanto, et al., A Model 
Code of Ethics for Guardians, 11 WHITTIER L. REV. 543, 550 (1989) (―[T]he guardian is required to exercise the 
highest degree of trust, loyalty and fidelity in making decisions on behalf of the ward.‖); id at 555 (―The relationship 
between a guardian and ward is fiduciary in nature.‖).   
4
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16 cmt. b (2000) (―A lawyer is a fiduciary.‖).   
5
 See John H. Langbein, Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?, 114 YALE L.J. 
929, 931 n.15 (2005).   
6
 See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006) (presenting a thorough exposition of several 
aspects of the director‘s and officer‘s fiduciary duty). 
7
 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (2006) (―Agency is the fiduciary relationship that arises when one 
person (a ‗principal‘) manifests to another person (an ‗agent‘) that the agent shall act on the principal‘s behalf and 
subject to the principal‘s control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.‖). See Burdett v. 
Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (discussing an agent‘s fiduciary duty to ―treat the principal as well as 
the agent would treat himself‖); Deborah A. DeMott, Disloyal Agents, 58 ALA. L. REV. 1049 (2007).   
8
 Thomas L. Hafemeister & Selina Spinos, Lean on Me: A Physician’s Fiduciary Duty to Disclose Medical Risk to 
the Patient, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1167 (2009). 
9
 Tthe Uniform Partnership Act (1997) provides that ―[t]he only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership 
and the other partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care . . . .‖ The Comment states: 
 
Arguably, the term ‗fiduciary‘ is inappropriate when used to describe the duties of a partner 
because a partner may legitimately pursue self-interest . . . and not solely the interest of the 
partnership and the other partners, as must a true trustee. Nevertheless, partners have long been 
characterized as fiduciaries. . . . Indeed, the law of partnership reflects the broader law of principal 
and agent, under which every agent is a fiduciary.  
 
UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404 cmt. 1 (1997). 
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 A fiduciary must display ―a true faithfulness and devotion‖ to the beneficiary,10 treating 
him ―as well as [he] would treat himself.‖11 He must, in many circumstances, follow the 
beneficiary‘s instructions, and not  only those communicated when  the relationship was formed 
but also those given  during the course of the relationship. He must consider  the implicit as well 
as the express instructions of the beneficiary, ―so as to infer, in a reasonable manner, what the 
[beneficiary] would wish the [fiduciary] to do in light of the facts of which the [fiduciary] has 
notice at the time of acting.‖12  
As this implies, the fiduciary must attend closely to the beneficiary‘s purposes. A recent 
article proposes that a fiduciary ―must appropriate the objectives, goals, or ends of another and 
then act on the basis of what the fiduciary believes will accomplish them—a happy marriage of 
the [beneficiary‘s] ends and the fiduciary's expertise.‖13 
The fiduciary has an especially high duty of disclosure.  More is required than that he 
avoid  fraud and false statements:  he must be candid, and offer additional information beyond 
what is specifically requested.
14
 He must also respect beneficiary confidences.  
A fiduciary‘s duties must not be diluted by  self-interest. The New York Court of Appeals 
has stated: ―it is elemental that a fiduciary owes a duty of undivided and undiluted loyalty to 
                                                 
10
 In re  Walt Disney Co Derivative  Litig.., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)(quoting with approval the statement in one 
of the opinions of the trial court in the case that ―[t]he good faith required of a corporate fiduciary includes . . .  a 
true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the corporation and its shareholders.‖).   
11
 Burdett v. Miller,, 957 F.2d 1375,  1381 (7
th
 Cir. 1992)(Posner, J.) (―A fiduciary duty is the duty of an agent to 
treat his principal with the utmost candor, rectitude, care, loyalty, and good faith--in fact to treat the principal as well 
as the agent would treat himself.‖)(citations omitted). 
12
  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.02 cmt. g (2006). 
13
 Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV.  99, 135 (2008).  
14
 See  Libby v. L.J. Corp., 247 F.2d 78, 81 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (Burger, J.) (―The duty imposed [upon joint 
adventurers] is essentially one of good faith, fair and open dealing and the utmost of candor and disclosure to all 
concerned.‖); Casasanto, et al., supra note 3, at 557 (―Inherent in the guardian's obligation to exhibit the highest 
degree of trust, loyalty and fidelity in relation to the ward is the requirement that the guardian share pertinent 
information with the ward about his or her condition and financial status as well as any decisions the guardian is 
contemplating or may have actually made. To the extent the ward is able to participate, there exists an affirmative 
duty on the part of the guardian to share relevant information with the ward and thus aim toward the goal of joint 
decision making.‖). 
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those whose interests the fiduciary is to protect . . . . [A] fiduciary . . . is bound to single-
mindedly pursue the interests of those to whom a duty of loyalty is owed  . . . .‖15  Justice 
Cardozo‘s opinion in Meinhard v. Salmon states: 
Joint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another, while the enterprise 
continues, the duty of the finest loyalty. Many forms of conduct permissible in a 
workaday world for those acting at arm's length, are forbidden to those bound by 
fiduciary ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the market 
place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most sensitive, is then 
the standard of behavior. As to this there has developed a tradition that is 
unbending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity has been the attitude of 
courts of equity when petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided loyalty by the 
‗disintegrating erosion‘ of particular exceptions . . . . Only thus has the level of 
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher than that trodden by the crowd. 
It will not consciously be lowered by any judgment of this court. . . . Salmon had 
put himself in a position in which thought of self was to be renounced, however 
hard the abnegation.
16
 
 
B. Legal Theories
17
 
Leading scholars explain fiduciary duty as penumbral to a contract.
18
 They explain it as a 
device for making contract law work under difficult circumstances:  under conditions, that is, 
where normal contract  doctrines may not achieve their purposes.
19
 Guardian-ward relationships 
afford an example. The guardian may breach his promises but avoid contract liability because the 
ward is a child and therefore unable supervise, detect breaches, complain or seek relief.
20
 
                                                 
15
 Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 576 73 N.Y. 461 , 466 (1989) (citations omitted). 
16
 Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546, 548 (N.Y. 1928).  \ See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Comm. 
on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 675-76 (Cal. 1983).   
17
 See generally Ethan J. Leib, Friends as Fiduciaries, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 665 (2009); Langbein, supra note 2; 
Deborah DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 
ARIZ. L. REV. 925, 934 n.46 (2006) (compiling references to many of the classic accounts of fiduciary duties).  
18
 Similar approaches, not discussed here, understand fiduciary duty as penumbral to tort or property law. See, e.g.,  
D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1403 (2002) (―What 
distinguishes a fiduciary from many other contracting parties . . . is that a fiduciary exercises discretion with respect 
to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary . . . .‖). 
19
 See Larry E. Ribstein, Are Partners Fiduciaries?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 209 (2005) passim and especially at 218 n. 
38 (discussing how ―fiduciary duties are a standard term that the law provides in order to minimize the parties‘ 
contracting cost‖). 
20
   
The common law imposes [a fiduciary] duty when the disparity between the parties in knowledge 
or power relevant to the performance of an undertaking is so vast that it is a reasonable inference 
5 
 
Attorney-client relationships supply another example. An attorney may fail to perform as 
promised but avoid liability because the client lacks the expertise to detect poor 
lawyering.
21
According to this analysis, the law imposes fiduciary duties in order to strengthen  
contract rights. By forbidding conflicts of interest, the law diminishes the fiduciary‘s temptation 
to violate his promises. By requiring fulsome disclosure, the law facilitates detection of 
misconduct. By affording unusually generous remedies, the law deters wrongdoing in an 
especially strong way.
22
  
                                                                                                                                                             
that had the parties in advance negotiated expressly over the issue they would have agreed that the 
agent owed the principal the high duty that we have described, because otherwise the principal 
would be placing himself at the agent's mercy. An example is the relation between a guardian and 
his minor ward, or a lawyer and his client. The ward, the client, is in no position to supervise or 
control the actions of his principal on his behalf; he must take those actions on trust; the fiduciary 
principle is designed to prevent that trust from being misplaced. 
 
Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1381 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). 
 
The reason for the duty is clearest when the agent has a broad discretion the exercise of which the 
principal cannot feasibly supervise, so that the principal is at the agent's mercy. The agent might 
be the lawyer, and the principal his client; or the agent might be an investment adviser, and the 
principal an orphaned child. If the agent has no discretion and the principal has a normal capacity 
for self-protection, ordinary contract principles should generally suffice. 
 
Pohl v. Nat‘l Benefits Consultants, Inc., 956 F.2d 126, 129 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.). 
 
21
 A lawyer is a fiduciary, that is, a person to whom another person‘s affairs are entrusted in 
circumstances that often make it difficult or undesirable for that other person to supervise closely 
the performance of the fiduciary. Assurances of the lawyer‘s competence, diligence, and loyalty 
are therefore vital. Lawyers often deal with matters most confidential and vital to the client. A 
lawyer‘s work is sometimes complex and technical, often is performed in the client‘s absence, and 
often cannot properly be evaluated simply by observing the results. Special safeguards are 
therefore necessary.      
 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 16, cmt. b (2000). 
 
   Another circumstance which may impede the functioning of contract doctrine is the conferral of broad discretion 
by one party upon another.  This is emphasized as a rationale for the recognition of fiduciary duties in Tamar 
Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983).   
22
 See generally DeMott, supra note 7, at 1056-57 (2007): 
 
The remedies available to a principal do not map neatly onto the contours of either contract law or 
tort law principles and remedies. For example, remedies that have the consequence of stripping 
profit or benefit from the agent do not necessarily approximate the amount of harm that a principal 
either has suffered or would be able to prove or the benefit that the principal expected to realize 
through the transaction conducted by the agent. As a consequence, fiduciary doctrine as a whole is 
often characterized as prophylactic, geared to discourage breach by persons subject to fiduciary 
6 
 
This account understands fiduciary duties to be instrumental goods. It explains them as 
means for achieving the performance of contract and implies that the moral bases of the fiduciary 
relationship are similar to the moral bases of contract. This understanding is criticized in the next 
section of this Article. 
The contract-instrumentalist approach implies that whether a relationship is fiduciary or not 
ought to depend on the presence or absence of  circumstances which impede the functioning of 
contract..  
C. Teachers 
Teachers are generally not subject to fiduciary duties as a matter of law.
23
 This might 
seem incongruous, as they are in a position to violate contractual duties and to do harm through 
bad teaching, and their violations  are not readily susceptible to remedy by those in their charge. 
The law‘s omission to subject teachers to fiduciary duties can be explained in part by 
institutional considerations. Most teachers are civil servants, subject to supervision  by school 
administrators, school boards, and other elected officials. Teachers are also, to some extent, 
subject to  supervision by parents. Perhaps these supplementary sources of  direction and control 
are sufficient to remedy the incapacity and lack of experience of the students. . 
                                                                                                                                                             
duties. Thus, a breach of a duty of loyalty triggers remedies and other consequences, distinct from 
whether the person protected by the duty can establish that the breach in fact led to injury or in 
fact stemmed from disloyal motives on the part of the fiduciary. It's no defense to a fiduciary who 
self-deals or otherwise breaches a duty of loyalty that the beneficiary of the duty in some sense 
benefited through the fiduciary's conduct. Fiduciary doctrine's stringency reflects pragmatic 
concerns. These include the difficulties inherent in judicial second-guessing of decisions that are 
often discretionary, as well as the ease with which a disloyal fiduciary may often conceal 
misconduct. 
 
(notes omitted). 
 
23
 See generally Kent Weeks & Rich Haglund, Fiduciary Duties of College and University Faculty and 
Administrators, 29  J.C. & U.L. 153 (2002). But cf. Michael Plaut, Boundary Issues in Teacher-Student 
Relationships, 19 J. SEX & MARITAL THERAPY 210 (1993) (suggesting that a fiduciary relationship exists between 
college teachers and their students). 
7 
 
Doubtless other  reasons can be adduced;
24
 but a key insight here is that these reasons are, 
in a broad sense, procedural.   They do not go to the moral core.   
II. THE BASIC ETHICS OF THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP 
  This section aims to discover  basic dimensions of the ethics underlying fiduciary 
relationships. It rejects contract-instrumentalism as insufficient and proposes a different basis. 
A. What We Are Looking For 
The aim of this article is not to justify the law. Some relationships which the law deems 
fiduciary may not stand on the same ethical basis as do most others; and some relationships 
which the law relegates to nonfiduciary categories may be  ―ethically fiduciary.‖ Perhaps, 
however, the law will prove suggestive.  So also may social practice and social morality.  
B. The Insufficiency of Contract Instrumentalism25 
The contract-instrumentalist approach implies a chilly approach to fiduciary 
commitments. Consider the limits: 
First, contract instrumentalism implies that there would be no fiduciary relationship 
where there was no contract.  If contract and contract ethics are founded mainly on the morality 
of promise, as many assert, then they afford little warrant for extension to instances where there 
has been no promise.
26
  Where there has been no clear offer or  no acceptance,  where the parties 
                                                 
24
 For example: teachers provide a service which, unlike those of most fiduciaries, takes effect only with the active 
participation of the beneficiary; so that, especially in the higher grades, any allegation of bad teaching might be 
rebutted by indica of bad studying.   
 
25
 See Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999).  
 
26
 Similarly, contract instrumentalism affords little or no basis for recognising fiduciary duties in  instances in which 
the contract has been fully performed (little basis, therefore, for establishing an attorney‘s duties to a former client 
for whom he has performed all his promises).  See DeMott, supra note 7, at 1057-58 (notes omitted): 
 
A possible generalization is that duties of loyalty play an exclusively subsidiary function, which is 
to assist in securing the performance of other duties. More specifically, duties of loyalty perform 
an insulation role that attaches adverse legal consequences to conduct by an agent or other 
fiduciary who undertakes a distracting interest or influence. Although this generalization helps 
8 
 
are not in privity, contract instrumentalism supplies no firm basis for fiduciary doctrine.  Such 
circumstances are endemic to connections deemed fjduciary both by law and social morality, and 
therefore we may suspect that contract instrumentalism misses the mark.  Attorneys, for 
example, frequently form relationships with clients through communications which are too 
generally phrased to amount to contractual offers; trustees in large organizations and directors in 
corporations are doubtfully in privity with those  whom they serve.   
Second, contract instrumentalism implies that fiduciary duties should  be closely bound 
to the contract terms, leaving little scope for obligations far removed from express undertakings.  
It supplies little support for the fiduciary‘s obligation zealously to serve the purposes of the 
beneficiary. 
Third, contract instrumentalism implies that fiduciary duties may be dispensed with when 
the good of contract can more efficiently be served in other ways.   If protection against breach 
of contract can more efficiently be afforded  by  institutional safeguards, for example,  the 
fiduciary approach ought to be eschewed. As indicated above, this may be the case with teachers. 
A final point notes the disparity  between the social morality of contract and the ethics 
which fiduciaries themselves often embrace and which society endorses. Contract morality  has a 
chilly feel,  incongruous with the self-extending, fulfilling, generous quality of the fiduciary 
persona.  Few lenders are zealous to serve the borrower.   Scrooge  performed his contracts; 
perhaps his virtues were sufficient to that end.  His were the ―morals of the market place‖ and 
imposed no requirement  for the renunciation of ―thought of self.‖     
                                                                                                                                                             
explain much about the consequences that follow breaches of duties of loyalty, its explanatory 
force has limits. For example, it is not a defense to an agent who breaches a duty of loyalty that the 
agent can establish that other duties owed the principal were performed with good outcomes for 
the principal. That is, if duties of loyalty have purely subsidiary functions, it's odd that the 
common law consistently denies the agent an affirmative defense of establishing due performance 
of the agent's duties of performance. 
 
 
9 
 
   
C. A Virtue-Based Dimension 
The true foundation for  fiduciary ethics is the noninstrumental good of the fiduciary 
virtues.   It is a good thing to be capable of loyalty, good to be honorable and trustworthy, good 
to be capable of service, good to be candid. It is good to be clear-headed, insightful, and wise:  
the mind with its excellences,  Aristotle persuades us, is ―the best thing in us.‖27  To be sure, 
such character traits are often good because of what they help to achieve  -- they may be helpful 
in securing wealth or prestige, for example -- but they are worth having and exercising in 
themselves, quite apart from what other things they may lead to. These propositions invoke 
Aristotelean ethics.  They are among the core doctrines of the virtue-based ethical theory which 
was developed in classical antiquity, which was embraced Thomas Aquinas and the Scholastics, 
and which thence laid the foundations of English equity.  Classical virtue-based ethics thus 
guided the Chancellors who created fiduciary principles.   
Space and time do not present the opportunity for a fundamental development of this 
ethic here. It must be commended by an appeal to common sense. Who would choose to be 
shifty, untrustworthy, selfish, muddle-headed, and foolish, though he had all the other goods? 
Who would not seek instead to be steady, faithful, loyal, reliable, clear-headed, and wise (even in 
                                                 
27
 See ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 1177a at 12-19 (page 163 of the Terence Irwin translation, 2d ed., 
1999) : 
 
If happiness [eudaemonia:  the final good for man] is activity in accord with virtue, it is 
reasonable for it to accord with the supreme virtue, which will be the virtue of the best thing.  The 
best is understanding . . .  and to understand what is fine and divine, by being itself either divine or 
the most divine element in us.  Hence complete happiness will be its activity in  accord with its 
proper virtue; and . . .  this activity is the activity of study.   
 
 
 
―Study‖ is a translation of a cognate of ‖theōrein.‖ Irwin explains: ―In Aristotle‘s most specialized use, theōrein 
refers to the contemplative study that he identifies with HAPPINESS, or with a part of it.  This is study in the sense 
in which I ‗study‘ a face or a scene that I already have in full view . . . .‖  Terence Irwin, ―Glossary,‖ in id. at 315, 
349.   
10 
 
those unusual circumstances where no profit or further advantage could be secured through the 
exercise of those virtues)?  Who would not seek, not only to possess, but also to act on these 
excellences of character?   Action brings to fruition the deliberations and dispositions of the 
acting person.  Good action expresses and deploys the actor‘s understanding of the good.28 (This 
might be illustrated by the example of a sculptor: it is good for him to have a sculptor‘s talent 
and training, good to develop it through study and observation, but good in yet a further way 
actually to practice his art. The actions of a good person extend his goodness and, so to speak, 
―realize‖ it and fulfill it.).29 
This virtue-based ethic provides a firm foundation for the fiduciary requirements of 
loyalty and zeal.Self-sacrifice and zealous  service, even when they do not fulfill a promise, 
exercise a set of important virtues. The virtue-based ethic exhorts the fiduciary  to look within 
himself, finding  his guide to action in his own nobler dispositions.    
D. What Constitutes an Ethically Fiduciary Relationship 
The virtue-based ethic suggests  elements which, when they concur, establish a fiduciary 
relationship. The first element, and the most obvious, is the presence of a  potential beneficiary 
and of an eligible bestower of fiduciary benefits.  A fiduciary relationship makes sense when 
circumstances present someone  (a ―suitable beneficiary‖) who needs or would  benefit by the 
steady and consistent exercise of the loyalties of a steadfast affiliate, and  someone (a ―qualified 
bestower of benefits‖) who possesses the skills and attributes needed to  exercise the fiduciary 
                                                 
28
 See John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor ¶ 71.2 (Encyclical Letter of August 6, 1993, 85 AAS 1133), in THE 
ENCYCLICALS OF JOHN PAUL II  674, 732 (J. Michael Miller, C.S.B., ed., Vatican Press, trans., 1996) (―Human acts . 
. . express and determine the goodness or evil of the individual who performs them.‖) (emphasis added). 
29
 See Karol Wojtyla, The Person: Subject and Community, in PERSON AND COMMUNITY: SELECTED ESSAYS 219, 
235 (Theresa Sandok, trans., 1993) (―In fulfilling an action, I fulfill myself in it.‖).   
 
11 
 
virtues in  ways  which supply those needs and confer benefits  suited to the circumstances and 
projects of the ―suitable beneficiary.‖ 
The second element is a relationship between the suitable beneficiary and the qualified 
bestower:   an accord or accession between them (not necessarily contractual) which  deploys the 
bestower to exercise zeal and loyalty and thereby to confer the appropriate benefits, and which 
disposes the beneficiary to receive them.  A common project goes a long way towards supplying 
this second element, especially when the project requires, for its completion, a focused and 
sustained effort. Ad libitem projects—that is, ones pursued without grave cause, under transient 
conditions — seldom evoke the fiduciary qualities. Perhaps the clerk of Oxenford in the 
Canterbury Tales,
30
 who ―gladly would . . . learn and gladly teach,‖ was under no special duty to 
the people he chanced to meet..    
A third element, not requisite but in many ways helpful, is that of social recognition. 
Fiduciaries are often holders of ―social offices,‖ identified (as are lawyers, physicians and 
teachers) as accredited bearers of expertise and exemplars of commendable ways of life.  Social 
norms about social offices confer a special firmness and clarity of definition. Some societies may 
project a culture of individualism and competition into certain relationships—stockholder-
stockholder for example—which other cultures would imbue with a spirit of trust. Fiduciary 
ethics appropriately respond to  inherited cultural understandings. 
 
E. Why it Matters 
Of course under any reasonable ethic, the fiduciary aims at the good of the beneficiary.  
How, then, has the virtue-based ethic any distinctive implications?  
                                                 
30
 GEOFFREY CHAUCER, THE CANTERBURY TALES, General Prologue, line 310. 
12 
 
Obviously, one major distinction looks to the type and range of benefits, since as 
discussed above the contact-instrumentalist ethic is chilly and warrants little more than  that 
degree of beneficent action required by  the terms of an agreement.  Virtue-based fiduciary ethics 
warrant more generous principles of fiduciary service.   
A second line of distinction concerns the fiduciary‘s self-understanding.  The virtue-
based ethic proposes an account which the fiduciary can take to heart and weave into his 
reflections upon himself. The fiduciary understands better and participates more fully in the 
goods of beneficence and loyalty if he understands that his role as fiduciary is based on those 
virtues, and on an ethic which endorses them as noninstrumental goods.
 31
  He is better off. 
A third point notes that the self-understanding of the fiduciary, in certain sorts of 
relationship, is of special importance to the beneficiary. This ―reflexive‖ dimension  will be 
referred to in the next section of this Article.         
III. TEACHERS AS FIDUCIARIES OF A SPECIAL SORT: KNOWLEDGE FIDUCIARIES; MODELING 
FIDUCIARIES 
It should be clear from the elements proposed in Section II D that, ethically, teachers are 
fiduciaries.  
A. Special Dimensions of the Teacher-Student Relationship 
Three features of the teacher-student relationship add special fiduciary dimensions.   
                                                 
31
 See generally ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. VI, in II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE 1729, 1807 
1144a 18-20 (Jonathan Barnes, ed., W. D. Ross, trans. (rev. by J.O. Urmson),  1984) (―in order to be good one must 
be in a certain state when one does the several acts, i.e. one must do them as a result of choice and for the sake of the 
acts themselves.‖).  Furthermore,  ―[t]he agent . . . must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first 
place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly 
his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character.‖ Id. at 1105a 30 – 1105b 1 (page 1746 in the Ross 
translation). He should deliberate carefully and understand the good of what he does, since choice involves 
―consideration and deliberation.‖ ARISTOTLE, EUDEMIAN ETHICS 1226b-8, in II THE COMPLETE WORKS OF 
ARISTOTLE 1922, 1942 (Jonathan. Barnes, ed., J. Solomon, trans., 1984).   
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First, unlike many other fiduciary associations, the ―matter‖ of the relationship—the 
―stuff‖ which is transferred—is knowledge. (So basic to the structure of a relationship is this 
aspect that it is appropriate to suggest a special subcategory: ―knowledge fiduciaries.‖) More 
fundamentally, the matter of the teacher-student relationship is the craft and skill and set of 
virtues which enable a person to apprehend, appreciate, and use knowledge:  to learn, to consider 
and reconsider, and in general, throughout life, to recognize, interpret, understand, and deepen 
understanding.(It is appropriate to suggest the term ―wisdom fiduciaries.‖)  From our teachers we 
learn to learn. We acquire the virtues needed to become, as to live a worthwhile life we must 
indeed become, teachers of ourselves. 
Second, a special sector of the knowledge and wisdom conferred in the student-teacher 
relationship consists in the understanding and practice of affiliation, human relations, and the 
fiduciary attributes themselves. Many school systems expressly aim to teach students about the 
civic order (in a Massachusetts formulation: the nature, of ―government, politics, and civic 
life‖).32 They seek to prepare students for effective integration into society.33 Massachusetts 
licensure standards require that a teacher ―[h]elps all students to understand American civic 
culture, its underlying ideals, founding political principles and political institutions, and to see 
themselves as members of a local, state, national, and international civic community.‖34 This 
suggests that loyalty and beneficence are also the ―matter‖ of the teacher-student relationship. 
(We can posit another subcategory: ―affiliational fiduciary.‖).   
                                                 
32
 MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, MASSACHUSETTS HISTORY AND SOCIAL SCIENCE CURRICULUM 
FRAMEWORK 86 (2003), available at http://www.doe.mass.edu/framework/hss/final/pdf  (identifying the goals of a 
twelfth-grade elective).  
33
 See National Education Association, Code of Ethics of the Education Profession (1975), reprinted in KENNETH A. 
STRIKE & JONAS H. SOLTIS, THE ETHICS OF TEACHING viii, ix (5th ed. 2009) (―The educator strives to help each 
student realize his or her potential as a worthy and effective member of society.‖).  
34
 Regulations for Educator Licensure and Preparation Program Approval, 603 CMR § 7.08(d)(4), available at 
http://www.doe.mass.edu/lawsregs/603CMR7.html?section=08 (last updated Oct. 14, 2009).  
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The third feature looks not only to what is transferred from teacher to student but to the 
medium of transfer. Teaching is personal in a way that most fiduciary roles are not. Teaching and 
the achievements of teaching possess a ―personalist‖ dimension. Teachers impart wisdom and 
the affiliational virtues  by modeling them to their students. Modeling is recognized by 
psychologists as a foundation for moral development in children,
35
 and there seems to be no 
reason to deny its efficacy among young adults as well.  It is appropriate to identify teachers as 
―modeling fiduciaries.‖ 
 
B. Why It Matters. 
       If, then, teachers are knowledge fiduciaries, wisdom fiduciaries,  affiliational fiduciaries, and 
modeling fiduciaries, it follows that the wisdom and knowledge about affiliations are central to 
his office.  It follows that the modeling of good relationships is a vital part of his vocation. 
Excellence in teaching entails possession of the social virtues – justice, fidelity, beneficence, and 
sensitive perceptivity in human relationships.      
                                                 
35
 See Gareth B. Matthews, Concept Formation and Moral Development, in PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES ON 
DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 175, 185 (James Russell ed., 1987):  
 
A young child is able to latch onto the moral kind, bravery, or lying, by grasping central 
paradigms of that kind . . . . Moral development is . . . something much more complicated than 
simple concept displacement.  It is:  enlarging the stock of paradigms  . . .; developing better and 
better definitions of whatever it is that these paradigms exemplify; appreciating better the relation 
between straightforward instances of the kind and close relatives; and learning to adjudicate 
competing claims from different moral kinds . . . . 
 
 
See generally A. Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory: An Agentic Perspective, 52 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY 1 (2001); 
Lawrence J. Walker, et al., Parent and Peer Contexts for Children’s Moral Reasoning Development, 71 CHILD 
DEVELOPMENT 1033, 1033 (2000):  
 
Psychoanalytic theory emphasizes early parent/child relationships in the development of 
conscience through the mechanism of identification and consequent internalization of values.  
Social-learning theory . . . emphasizes the power of models and so has also focused on parents‘ 
role in displaying and reinforcing appropriate behaviors.  Cognitive development theory . . . holds 
that interactions with peers are more potent . . . . 
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     It further follows that excellence in teaching involves the exercise of the social virtues.  
Solidarity with his colleagues, excellence in his relationships with students, and a respectful 
recognition of the relationships which his students have with their families, are all crucial 
elements in the fiduciary excellence of the teacher.   It follows that central to his mission as a 
teacher are  his understanding  of the elements of marriage and his presentation, in word and in 
deed, of the fundamental elements which make marriage what it is. 
 
V.  WORRISOME PATHOLOGIES 
Fiduciary recognition miscarries, as does affiliational modeling, when a teacher embraces 
the contract-instrumentalist understanding of his professional role, presenting to his students a 
chilly, ―I just do what I‘ve promised and I do it for the money,‖ attitude. He fails to fulfill 
himself as he might as a teacher, and he deprives his students of an appropriate fiduciary model.  
He invites them to a teacher-student relationship  which likely implies a similarly self-involved 
attitude and a similar minimalism of commitment.
36
     
A teacher, as a fiduciary whose ethic is founded on the modeling of affiliational 
knowledge, violates his trust in a fundamental way when he ignores, deplores or misunderstands 
                                                 
36
 See generally Pope Benedict XVI, ―Take Upon Yourselves Without Hesitation the Commitment to Educate,‖ 
Address to the Bishops Gathered for the 61st General Assembly of the Italian Episcopal Conference (May 27, 2010), 
reprinted in L‘OSSERVATORE ROMANO, June 2, 2010, at 1, 3 (English edition) : 
 
One essential root [of a contemporary ―emergency‖ in education] I think consists in a false 
concept of man‘s autonomy:  man should develop on his own, without interference from others, 
who could assist his self-development but should not enter into this development.  In reality, the 
essential fact is that the human person becomes himself only with the other.  The ―I‖ become itself 
only from the ―thou‖ and from the ―you‖.  It is created for dialogue, for synchronic and diachronic 
communion.  It is only the encounter with the ―you‖ and with the ―we‖ that the ―I‖ opens to itself. 
Thus, the so-called antiauthoritarian education is not education but the rejection of education; thus 
what we are bound to impart to others is not imparted, meaning this ―you‖ and ―we‖ in which the 
―I‖ opens to itself. 
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the committed affiliational modalities of his students‘ lives and of the social order to which they 
belong.
37
 
Fiduciary recognition would miscarry if it portrayed other relationships of service in 
ways which distorted or occluded the fiduciary-like elements. Teachers would damage their own 
fiduciary mission if they ignored or deplored the duty-bearing, fiduciary-like aspect of the 
parent-child relationship. Teachers might, for example be misled by some contemporary social-
science writing which proposes that parents act mainly out of a ―need for belongingness‖38 or a 
―dyadic intention toward a . . . . dependent growing out of a feeling toward that dependent,‖39 
maintaining  that ―[w]hat the parent does is to feel. . . . [C]ognitions are not what motives a 
parent‘s actions – emotions are ….‖40 
Fiduciary recognition would  miscarry if it adopted a similarly emotionalist 
understanding of marriage.  So might a teacher do who  adopted the view of one fairly prominent 
scholar, who writes: ―marriage today is a home for the heart: entering, furnishing, and exiting 
that home is your business alone. Today‘s marriage—from whatever angle you look—is justified 
                                                 
37
 See  National Education Association, supra note 42, at ix (―[T]he educator . . . [s]hall not deliberately suppress or 
distort subject matter relevant to the student‘s progress.‖). 
38
 See Catrin Finkenauer & Wim Meeus, How (Pro-)Social Is the Caring Motive?, 11 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 100, 
101 (2000)(An ―important motive for caregiving may be found in the human need for belongingness . . . . People . . .  
go to great lengths to feel they belong and to avoid feeling lonely.‖).  For references to authorities which account for 
attachments based on needs, see David C. Bell & Alan J. Richard, Caregiving: The Forgotten Element in 
Attachment, 11 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 69, 76 (2000).  
39
 Bell & Richard, supra, at 79.  See generally David C. Bell & Alan J. Richard, Authors’ Response:  The Search for 
a Caregiving Motivation, 11 PSYCHOLOGICAL INQUIRY 124 (2000). 
40
 Bell & Richard, supra note 46, at 75: 
 
[T]he parent looks into the child‘s eyes.  What the parent does is to feel . . . . [T]his is not a 
thinking moment.  It is a feeling moment.  This moment and all the lifetime of moments following 
when I love her and try to understand her and try to meet her needs with my limited resources are 
feeling moments.  Cognitions will be important in all these moments . . . . But these cognitions are 
not what motivate the parent‘s actions – emotions are . . . .  
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by the happiness of the pair.‖41 Fiduciary recognition by a teacher would miscarry  if the teacher 
adopted a contract-instrumentalist account of the relationship between married couples, equating 
husbands and wives to  the cohabitors whose attitudes are  described in a fairly recent study:
42
 
I find that most cohabiting parents begin cohabiting in response to 
a pregnancy but do not believe they should stay in a relationship 
because of shared children. They view cohabitation as a practical 
response to parenthood that allows them to coparent and share 
expenses yet avoid the greater expectations of commitment, 
relationship quality, and more traditional and scripted family roles 
they associate with marriage. 
 
         
 
                                                 
41
 E. J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? THE STRANGE SOCIAL HISTORY OF OUR MOST INTIMATE INSTITUTION  251 
(2004).         
42
 Joanna M. Reed, Not Crossing the ‘Extra Line”:  How Cohabitors with Children View their Unions, 68 J. 
MARRIAGE & FAMILY 1117 (2006),  available at http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/doi/abs/10.111.j.1741-
3737.2006.00318.x. 
 
